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Justice Kennedy’s White Nationalism 
Russell K. Robinson* 
This Essay places frequently celebrated sexual orientation opinions 
written by Justice Anthony Kennedy into conversation with his opinions in 
immigration and national security contexts. This juxtaposition reveals the 
identity-based borders of the liberty and dignity that Justice Kennedy often 
valorized when gays and lesbian asserted their rights. A close analysis of 
Justice Kennedy’s final sexual orientation opinion, Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and the final national security 
opinion that he joined, Trump v. Hawaii, demonstrates that Justice 
Kennedy’s commitment to social hierarchy privileged the interests and 
perspectives of white, heterosexual Christians and ultimately harmed a 
wide swath of sexual, racial, and religious minorities. 
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“Love Wins.”† 
“Love Knows No Borders.”‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
Central to Justice Kennedy’s legacy is a series of groundbreaking 
opinions concerning the rights of sexual minorities, from Romer v. 
Evans1 to Obergefell v. Hodges.2 The #LoveWins Twitter hashtag was 
ubiquitous after Obergefell announced that same-sex couples enjoy a 
fundamental right to marry in June 2015. President Barack Obama, First 
Lady Michelle Obama, and Vice President Joe Biden used the hashtag, 
alongside celebrities such as Lady Gaga, Beyoncé, and Taylor Swift, and 
corporations such as Coca Cola and Starbucks.3 One corporation, 
Honeymaid, posted a map of the fifty states and proclaimed: “Starting 
today, love knows no borders.”4 Yet placing Obergefell and its sister 
opinions in the context of immigration-related cases makes evident the 
stark limits and “borders” that Justice Kennedy imposed on the right to 
marry and other foundational rights. Even as Justice Kennedy 
 
 † TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/lovewins (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (in 
search bar, search term “#lovewins”). 
 ‡ Visit Border, SHUTDOWN HOMESTEAD DET. CTR., https://migrantjustice.afsc.org/visit-
border (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LY6C-UED8]. 
 1 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Most Court observers cite Justice Kennedy’s opinions on 
sexual orientation and First Amendment as central to his legacy. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, 
The First Amendment’s Undisputed Champion, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018, 6:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-first-amendments-undisputed-champion-1530311830 
(referring to Justice Kennedy as “the First Amendment champion of the High Court”); 
Opinion, Kennedy , N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A26 (stating that Justice Kennedy “led 
the way in recognizing the equality and dignity of gays and lesbians”). Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky persuasively critiques the reductive reading of Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence required to brand him a “First Amendment champion.” See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Justice Kennedy: A Free Speech Justice? Only Sometimes, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 
1193, 1193-94 (2019). 
 3 See BEHIND THE HASHTAG, http://series.hashtagsunplugged.com/lovewins (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9GZH-9REA]. 
 4 Id. Refrains such as this have been used more often in debates about immigration 
law. See, e.g., “Love Knows No Borders” Protest at U.S.-Mexico Border, FSTV, 
https://freespeech.org/stories/love-knows-no-borders-protest-at-us-mexico-border/ 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (featuring an event where protesters demanded “that 
migrants and refugees seeking asylum in the U.S. be allowed into the country”); Cindy 
Knoebel, “Love Knows No Borders” Demonstrators Gather at Border, IMMPRINT (Dec. 13, 
2018) https://imm-print.com/love-knows-no-bounds-demonstrators-gather-at-border-
9b2e9b12b4ee/ (describing a peaceful protest of over four-hundred people showing 
“solidarity with migrants facing violent anti-immigrant rhetoric and persecution from 
the U.S. government, and an increasingly militarized U.S. border”). 
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underscored the importance of affirming gays’ and lesbians’ dignity and 
inclusion as full citizens, his jurisprudence fostered a hierarchy of 
belonging and exclusion along lines including race, gender, national 
origin, religion, citizenship, and their intersections. 
This Essay argues that Trump v. Hawaii,5 the final decision in Justice 
Kennedy’s 30-year career, serves as a foil and provides a critical frame 
for understanding Justice Kennedy’s sexual orientation cases. I make 
manifest the often-overlooked undercurrent of a caste system embedded 
in several earlier Kennedy opinions. The nascent hierarchy in his sexual 
orientation opinions became undeniable when the travel ban case 
validated President Trump’s white nationalism. Justice Kennedy’s final 
and fateful swing vote casts an unforgiving glare on the celebratory 
popular understanding of the sexual orientation cases and Justice 
Kennedy’s overall legacy.6 
In this Essay, I develop a broader project of doctrinal intersectionality, 
juxtaposing doctrinal domains that are often thought of as distinct in 
search of new insights and frameworks.7 By assigning cases to different 
silos like “sexual orientation” or “immigration,” scholars and teachers 
might miss how these cases converge or clash. Placing cases from 
different silos in conversation with each other may make visible broader 
projects that a Justice or coalition of Justices may pursue without 
naming the project as such. 
 
 5 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 6 For an example of the unmitigated gratitude to Justice Kennedy expressed by 
some LGBTQ people, see Jessica Contrera, Anthony Kennedy and the Four Supreme Court 
Rulings That Changed Gay Life in America, WASH. POST. (June 27, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/anthony-kennedy-and-the-four-
supreme-court-rulings-that-changed-gay-life-in-america/2018/06/27/fc2a345c-7a48-
11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html. Such celebrations tend not to mention Justice 
Kennedy’s role in immigration and national security jurisprudence. 
 7 See generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 215 
(2016) [hereinafter Unequal] (arguing that “the Court is not sufficiently integrating 
equal protection jurisprudence across identity categories”). I thank David Pozen for 
suggesting the term “doctrinal intersectionality.” I seek to build on Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s foundational work on intersectionality. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139 (demonstrating how a single-axis framework of analysis focusing on Black men 
and white women in anti-discrimination law and feminist and antiracist politics 
marginalizes Black women); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) 
(arguing that narrow understandings of gender and race have worked together to 
marginalize Black women in the discourse of violence against women). This piece calls 
for a renewed effort to utilize intersectionality in the courts, with a specific focus on 
constitutional law. 
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There are multiple possible conceptions of “white nationalism.” I 
define this ideology as the belief that white people, especially white 
men, should remain at the center of national identity and hold a 
disproportionate amount of political and economic power.8 This is a 
version of white supremacy that foregrounds the role of race in nation-
building. In order to justify this white dominance, white nationalism 
requires a racial “other.” Although othering techniques shift over time, 
a core tactic is demonizing certain racial minorities as “un-American” 
and a threat to national integrity. An intersectional lens teaches us that, 
even though this project centers heterosexual, cisgender, Christian 
white men, it seeks opportunities to incorporate some white women and 
white LGBTQ people.9 
 
 8 Cf. Mari J. Matsuda, This is (Not) Who We Are: Korematsu, Constitutional 
Interpretation, and National Identity, 128 YALE L.J.F. 657, 677 (2019), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Matsuda_27pnjaj1.pdf (referring to a “structural 
system intertwined, inevitably, with other forms of subordination that work 
synergistically to benefit the few who have power over the many”); Jayashri Srikantiah 
& Shirrin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 
197 (2019), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/02/71-
Stan.-L.-Rev.-Srikantiah-Sinnar.pdf (“We view white nationalism as ‘the belief that 
national identity should be built around white ethnicity, and that white people should 
therefore maintain both a demographic majority and dominance of the nation’s culture 
and public life.’”).  
 9 Consider, for example, that more white women voted for Trump than Hillary 
Clinton. See, e.g., Molly Ball, Donald Trump Didn’t Really Win 52% of White Women in 
2016, TIME (Oct. 18, 2018), https://time.com/5422644/trump-white-women-2016/ 
(recounting exit poll finding 52% Trump support and a potentially more reliable Pew 
study finding of 47% percent Trump support and 45% Clinton support among white 
women voters). Trump administration officials include openly gay white men, 
including Ric Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, and Judd Deere, deputy White 
House press secretary. See Dominic Holden, This Trump Spokesperson Is Gay – and He 
Doesn’t Care If That Makes the Left Mad, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 1, 2019, 2:39 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/dominicholden/trump-judd-deere-lgbtq-profile. 
Tech entrepreneur Peter Thiel ranks seventh on the list of Trump’s top donors, and his 
company has gained $1.5 billion in government contracts, including ICE-related 
surveillance work. See Tristan Greene, Study: Trump’s Paid Peter Thiel’s Palantir $1.5B 
so Far to Build ICE’s Mass-Surveillance Network, NEXT WEB (Aug. 12, 2019, 1:28 PM), 
https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/08/12/study-trumps-paid-peter-
thiels-palantir-1-5b-so-far-to-build-ices-mass-surveillance-network/. A Buzzfeed profile 
of Deere sums up the utility of gay white men to the Republican party as follows:  
Conservatives can be fine having gay Republicans around – particularly white 
gay men, who reflect the same bloc that makes up Trump’s white male base. 
These gay people enjoy a retractable leash that gives them access to social 
networks and power – as long as they share other Republican priorities, like a 
border wall and gun rights, and don’t dwell on their sexuality or gay rights. In 
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The racial politics embodied in President Trump’s campaign to “Make 
America Great Again” exemplify “white nationalism.” To illustrate, 
consider an article that Trump tweeted about in early 2019. The author, 
Pat Buchanan, asserted that in the absence of a “militarized” U.S.-
Mexico border wall, “the United States, as we have known it, is going 
to cease to exist.”10 Buchanan argued that the “more multiracial, 
multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual America becomes — the less it 
looks like Ronald Reagan’s America.”11 Buchanan further posited that 
white men are central to the American identity, and the Democratic 
party aims to reduce the number of white male voters while increasing 
the voting strength of women and people of color.12  
As suggested by the above, white nationalism is a nostalgic project of 
building and preserving the United States by looking to the past, before 
the rise of civil rights, women’s rights and the “browning” of America.13 
Proponents of white nationalism view immigration policy as inherently 
racialized and the resulting racial/ethnic diversity it fosters as a threat 
to America’s essential status as a white patriarchy. White nationalism 
also often interpolates a conflation of “Christian,” “white,” and 
“nation.”14 From this perspective, the nation’s survival hinges on 
resisting religious/racial diversification and hewing to white Christian 
 
this arrangement, conservatives can be accommodating to gay people, 
provided it remains legal to discriminate against them.  
Holden, supra.  
 10 Patrick J. Buchanan, Memo to Trump: Declare an Emergency, CNS NEWS (Jan. 11, 
2019, 8:38 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/patrick-j-buchanan/patrick-
buchanan-memo-trump-declare-emergency; see Aaron Rupar, Trump Promotes Pat 
Buchanan Column that Makes White Nationalist Case for His Border Wall, VOX (Jan. 14, 
2019 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/14/18181897/trump-pat-buchanan-
column-tweet; see also ERIC KAUFMANN, WHITESHIFT: POPULISM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE 
FUTURE OF WHITE MAJORITIES 92-93 (2019) (drawing connections between Buchanan’s 
racial politics in the 1990s and those of Trump in 2016). 
 11 Buchanan, supra note 10. 
 12 See id. (“The only way to greater ‘diversity,’ the golden calf of the Democratic 
Party, is to increase the number of women, African-Americans, Asians and Hispanics, 
and thereby reduce the number of white men.”). 
 13 See KAUFMANN, supra note 10, at 89-90. 
 14 See, e.g., Andrew L. Whitehead et al., Make America Christian Again: Christian 
Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election, 79 SOC. 
RELIGION 147, 153 (2018) (“Christian nationalism can serve as an ethno-nationalist 
symbolic boundary portraying nonwhites and Muslims as threatening cultural 
outsiders.”); id. at 153 n.3 (“Christian nationalism and Islamophobia, with respect to 
the Trump vote, might be understood as two sides of the same coin.”). 
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dominance.15 Although I look to discourse during the Trump 
presidency for this definition, we should understand Trump as 
crystallizing and deploying deep-seated conceptions of national 
identity, rather than creating something entirely new. Trump-era white 
nationalism builds on the longstanding project of white supremacy, yet 
it amplifies the demonization of Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and 
South Asian people, and Latino/a/x people, especially Mexicans, all of 
which are deemed to be threats to the preservation of America’s white 
identity.  
Trump’s racial taunts often fixate on whether or not a person is a 
“real” American. For instance, long before his election, he “falsely 
asserted that President Barack Obama was born overseas and had forged 
his birth certificate.”16 In 2019, he told four progressive congresswomen 
of color to “go back” to “the crime infested places from which they 
came” because they “hate our country.”17 All of them are U.S. citizens, 
and three were born in the United States.18 When Trump demeans 
people of color and their origins, he often implies not only that America 
is “great,” but also that it is pure and in need of protection from people 
of color.19 From Trump’s vantage, Latin American migrants are not 
everyday people coming to the United States. in search of a better life. 
Rather, they represent an “invasion” that includes rapists, drug dealers, 
and terrorists. Trump argued against admitting African immigrants 
from “shitholes countries” and sought to turn away Haitian immigrants 
with the stereotype that they “all have AIDS.”20 In case the racial nature 
 
 15 See id. at 153 (“Christian nationalism operates as a set of beliefs and ideals that 
seek the national preservation of a supposedly unique Christian identity.”). 
 16 Timothy L. O’Brien, Trump Can’t Just Walk Away from ‘Send Her Back,’ BLOOMBERG 
(July 19, 2019 3:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-19/-
send-her-back-evokes-donald-trump-s-long-racist-past. 
 17 Ashley Parker, et al., Trump Says They ‘Hate Our Country.’ The Democrats He Attacked 
Say the Country ‘Belongs to Everyone,’ WASH. POST (July 15, 2019, 11:14 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-calls-on-minority-congresswomen-to-
apologize-after-he-said-they-should-go-back-to-their-countries/2019/07/15/897f1dd0-
a6ef-11e9-a3a6-ab670962db05_story.html. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See, e.g., Toluse Olorunnipa, Trump’s Incendiary Rhetoric is Met with Fading 
Resistance From Republican and Corporate Leaders, WASH. POST (July 15, 2019, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-incendiary-rhetoric-is-met-with-
fading-resistance-from-republican-and-corporate-leaders/2019/07/15/d0e0d918-a710-
11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html (quoting Trump tweet in which he described the 
U.S. as “the greatest and most powerful Nation on earth”). 
 20 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging Words 
for Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/ 
11/us/politics/trump-shithole-countries.html. 
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of these comments were not plain, Trump contrasted these countries 
with Norway.21 Even predominantly black cities that are indisputably 
part of America are located outside of the “real” America when Trump 
derides cities like Baltimore as a “rat and rodent infested mess” and 
assigns responsibility for their condition to black officials.22 In sum, 
Trump’s white nationalism consistently associates people of color with 
danger, defecation and degeneration, and a threat to America’s purity 
and greatness.23 
Many people believe that white nationalists are members of a fringe 
group akin to the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazis, and that their existence 
says little about mainstream America.24 Indeed, Trump minimized the 
problem of white nationalism in these terms after a white Australian 
killed dozens of people at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and 
praised Trump as a “symbol of renewed white identity and common 
purpose.”25 To people who share the view that white nationalism is a 
 
 21 See id. 
 22 See Spencer Kimball, Trump Calls Baltimore a ‘Disgusting, Rat and Rodent Infested 
Mess’ in Attack on Rep. Elijah Cummings, CNBC (July 27, 2019, 1:31 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/27/trump-calls-baltimore-a-disgusting-rat-and-rodent-
infested-mess-in-attack-on-rep-elijah-cummings.html. 
 23 As this Essay goes to press, the House of Representatives is aggressively pursuing 
an impeachment inquiry. In the words of one representative, her concern is that “the 
president — the most powerful man in the world — reached out to a foreigner, a foreign 
leader, and asked him to dig up dirt on an American.” Mike DeBonis & Amber Phillips, 
For House Democrats, Impeachment Probe Widens the Divide They Hoped to Bridge, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 5, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/for-house-
democrats-impeachment-probe-widens-the-divide-they-hoped-to-bridge/2019/10/05/ 
3be23cc2-e6b1-11e9-a331-2df12d56a80b_story.html. Trump’s flagrant solicitation of 
other countries, such as Russia and China, to interfere with U.S. politics and willingness 
to rely on foreign powers to retain his precarious grasp on the presidency further 
complicates his claims about the “real America” and the need for national integrity and 
purity. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Eileen Sullivan, Trump Publicly Urges China to Investigate 
the Bidens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/us/politics/ 
trump-china-bidens.html. Unfortunately, I cannot fully analyze these developments in 
this short piece. 
 24 See Yoram Hazony, How Americans Lost Their National Identity, TIME (Oct. 23, 
2018), http://time.com/5431089/trump-white-nationalism-bible/ (“‘White nationalism’ 
is used to describe the small fringe of Americans who believe nationality is defined by 
the color of one’s skin. . . . Most Americans find these attempts to reduce nationality to 
race repugnant.”).  
 25 See Jonathan Lemire, After New Zealand Massacre, Trump Downplays White 
Nationalist Threat, PBS (Mar. 15, 2019, 7:40 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
politics/after-new-zealand-massacre-trump-downplays-white-nationalism-threat. When a 
reporter asked him about the threat of white supremacy, Trump said “I think it’s a small 
group of people that have very, very serious problems, I guess.” Id. In August 2019, a 
white male Trump supporter slaughtered 22 people, many of whom were Latino/a/x. 
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fringe issue, it must be galling to hear a law professor align a Supreme 
Court Justice with white nationalism. Yet this Essay argues that aiding 
and abetting white nationalism is itself a form of white nationalism.26 
This definition encompasses Trump voters and Republican officials who 
twist themselves into knots to avoid denouncing Trump’s statements 
 
See Amanda Jackson et al., Police Believe the El Paso Shooter Targeted Latinos. These Are 
the Victims’ Stories, CNN (Aug. 7, 2019, 12:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/ 
04/us/el-paso-shooting-victims/index.html. Media scrutiny revealed that the FBI has 
often failed to treat such attacks as domestic terrorism and investigate and seek to 
prevent such attacks as vigorously as foreign terrorism. See, e.g., Elisha Fieldstadt & 
Ken Dilanian, White Nationalism-Fueled Violence Is on the Rise, But FBI is Slow to Call It 
Domestic Terrorism, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/white-nationalism-fueled-violence-rise-fbi-slow-call-it-domestic-n1039206. 
The El Paso shooting followed recent shootings at a black church in South Carolina and 
on black shoppers at a Kroger grocery store in Kentucky, and several attacks on 
synagogues, mosques, and a Sikh temple. See id.; Matt Zapotosky, Justice Dept. Brings 
Hate-Crime Charges Against Man Accused of Shooting Black Customers at Kentucky 
Kroger, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/justice-dept-brings-hate-crime-charges-against-man-accused-of-
shooting-black-customers-at-kentucky-kroger/2018/11/15/ce01bf66-e91d-11e8-b8dc-
66cca409c180_story.html; Kelly Weill, More Than 500 Attacks on Muslims in America 
This Year, DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2019, 5:07 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/more-
than-500-attacks-on-muslims-in-america-this-year. According to Michael McGarrity, 
the FBI’s counterterrorism chief, as of May 2019, 80 percent of the bureau’s resources 
were focused on foreign terrorism. See Fieldstadt & Dilanian, supra. In 2009, an internal 
FBI report on white extremism caused a furious backlash when it was leaked to ring-
wing media. In response, the Obama administration disbanded the team of analysts 
focused on right-wing extremism and stopped providing training on this front. See Daryl 
Johnson, I Warned of Right-Wing Violence in 2009. Republicans Objected. I Was Right. 
WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-warned-of-right-wing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-an-
uproar-i-was-right/. 
 26 As an example of “aiding and abetting,” consider Eric Kaufmann’s WHITESHIFT, a 
scholarly attempt to legitimize white voters’ concerns about the shrinking white 
majority in several Western countries. KAUFMANN, supra note 10. Apparently because 
the author is a faculty member at a respected liberal university, liberal media have 
greeted the book with an openness that they do not generally extend to ideological 
arguments that circulate on Breitbart or Fox News. See, e.g., Isaac Chotiner, A Political 
Scientist Defends White Identity Politics, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-political-scientist-defends-white-identity-
politics-eric-kaufmann-whiteshift-book. But make no mistake — Kaufmann’s lengthy 
book is, at its core, an argument in favor of preserving a “white majority.” KAUFMANN, 
supra note 10, at 510. It urges white people to no longer deny their desire for their 
country to stay white, see id. at 516; tries to deflect the claim that such arguments are 
racist, see id. at 328; doubts that structural racism (an “ethereal concept”) really exists, 
see id. at 331-334; deems critical race theory “anti-white” (although his citations suggest 
he may not have actually read much of it), see id. at 331, 517; and argues that whites 
should assimilate multiracial people (like the author) into whiteness in order to 
preserve white supremacy, see id. at 446, 466-67. 
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and policies as racist and who help him maintain power.27 Even those 
who voted for Trump despite his racial politics deemed the lives of 
people of color and the Constitution’s promise of equal protection to be 
acceptable collateral damage. In my view, that’s racist. Likewise, I will 
argue that Justice Kennedy’s legitimation of Trump’s Muslim ban 
advanced a white nationalist agenda even if Justice Kennedy harbored 
no personal animosity toward Muslims.  
Notwithstanding its title, this Essay is about much more than Justice 
Kennedy. It is also about the evolution of racism over the last decade. 
As a senior FBI analyst who sounded the alarm on white supremacist 
terrorism in 2009 stated: 
Trump’s endorsement of the border wall, the travel ban, mass 
deportations of illegal immigrants — these ideas were touted on 
white supremacist message boards merely ten years ago. Now 
they are being put forth as official U.S. policy. Such 
controversial plans have placated white supremacists and anti-
government extremists and will draw still more sympathetic 
individuals toward these extremist causes along with the sort of 
violent acts that too often follow, like Charlottesville. . . . The 
Islamist militants who brought down the World Trade Center’s 
twin towers 16 years ago (or the ones who rammed their 
vehicles into pedestrians in London, Paris and Barcelona 
recently) had no domestic constituency. Their acts weren’t 
enshrined instantly on social media or obliquely heralded by the 
president and duly elected representatives. Nor were the events 
rationalized by media ideologues dead set on preventing a 
political backlash. The terrorists I have dedicated my life to 
stopping have had all that going in their favor.28 
As indicated by the above, white nationalism enjoys structural 
support that may endure long after Justice Kennedy’s retirement. This 
Essay sheds light on the pervasiveness of white nationalism, how Trump 
has remade the Republican party in his image, and how Republican-
appointed Justices, including even Justice Kennedy, fell in line with 
 
 27 See, e.g., Olorunnipa, supra note 19. The House voted to condemn Trump’s “racist 
comments,” but only four Republicans voted in favor of this measure. Allan Smith et 
al., House Votes to Condemn Trump ‘Racist Comments,’ with Only Four Republicans 
Backing the Measure, NBC NEWS (July 16, 2019, 5:02 AM), https://www.nbcnews. 
com/politics/donald-trump/house-vote-resolution-condemning-trump-s-racist-comhttps:// 
www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/house-vote-resolution-condemning-trump-
s-racist-comments-n1030266icansments-n1030266. 
 28 Johnson, supra note 25. 
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their avowedly political counterparts. It is a story of how racism may 
permeate judicial reasoning without being fully recognized as such. It 
is a call to probe judicial claims of neutrality — such as Chief Justice 
Roberts’ claim that “[w]e do not have Obama judges or Trump 
judges,”29 because they may cloak unseemly power dynamics, including 
a white nationalist agenda.30  
In making this argument, I must confront a longstanding divide 
between whites and blacks as to what exactly constitutes racism.  
As I wrote in a 2008 article entitled Perceptual Segregation: 
In talking about ‘racism’ or ‘discrimination,’ black and white 
speakers think they are talking about the same thing, but they 
may not be. Whites may require overt, indisputable proof, while 
blacks might be more likely to accept circumstantial evidence. 
Moreover, whites may focus on the intent of the white person, 
while blacks may be concerned with the effect of the white 
person’s conduct, given their belief in the interactional and 
implicit nature of much discrimination.31 
Perceptual Segregation synthesized a considerable body of 
psychological and sociological evidence demonstrating that, on average, 
a white person and a black person are differently situated as to how they 
assess the possibility of racial discrimination.32 Most whites adhere to a 
“colorblindness perspective,” which believes that most white people do 
not see race.33 “Deviations from this norm are unusual” and require 
“overt evidence of racial hostility, such as using a racial epithet.”34 By 
contrast, black people are likely to see racism as “common and 
structural.”35 Applying this “pervasive prejudice perspective,” black 
people thus may apply a differential evidentiary standard and look for 
 
 29 See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Roberts Defends Judicial Independence After Trump 
Attacks Obama Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/ 
21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html.  
 30 See Matsuda, supra note 8, at 678 (noting that “critiquing claims of neutral 
principles” is one goal of critical race theory).  
 31 Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1127 
(2008) [hereinafter Perceptual]. 
 32 See, e.g., id. at 1117-36. Given the limitations of available empirical data on other 
people of color, which is sparse and mixed, Perceptual Segregation refrained from 
drawing broad conclusions as to how such groups ascertain discrimination. See id. at 
1104. 
 33 See id. at 1126. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
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indicators of bias that may elude most white readers.36 Importantly, 
blacks and whites tend to differ strongly on the value of race-
consciousness. Many mainstream white people experience efforts to 
think about the racial dimensions of society and law as offensive and 
uncomfortable, while “blacks tend to see race-consciousness as critical 
to their survival in white-dominated realms.”37 
An important study by Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton, 
explored what they called “lay theories about white racists” with a 
predominantly-white sample of students and working adults.38 
Sommers and Norton found broad support among whites for a narrow 
construction of racism, such as being a member of a group that 
promotes white supremacy or favoring white job applicants over 
blacks,39 but there was much less support for more mundane examples 
of possible racism.40 For example, there was less agreement on the idea 
that denying that racism remains a problem is itself a manifestation of 
racism.41 Similarly, white subjects were less likely to describe as racist 
acquiescing to a friend telling an offensive joke or “only dat[ing] white 
people.”42 Sommers and Norton (who are both white men) theorized 
that white subjects considered their own behavior when defining racism 
and excluded practices that might be self-implicating. The people of 
color in their study were more likely to define racism broadly.43 
Perceptual Segregation was published a few months before the nation 
elected its first black president, Barack H. Obama.44 The election of 
Donald Trump ushered in an era of newly explicit and pervasive racial 
hostility. Some mainstream white people who had been seduced by the 
idea that Obama’s victory signified a “post-racial” landscape may have 
been jolted out of complacency by Obama’s successor, who denied that 
Obama was a U.S. citizen, stereotyped Mexicans as rapists and thugs, 
promised to build a wall to keep out undesirable immigrants, vilified 
 
 36 See id. at 1126-27.  
 37 Id. at 1127. 
 38 See Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: 
What Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 
121, 125-26, 130 (2006). 
 39 See id. at 127-28 (“Most laypeople seem to agree that a White person who 
‘discourages kids from playing with Blacks,’ ‘favors White over Black job applicants,’ or 
‘belongs to a group that promotes racial bigotry’ constitutes a racial prototype.”). 
 
40
 See id. at 132. 
 41 See id. at 130. 
 42 See id. at 126-28, 128 n.3. 
 43 See id. at 132.  
 44 Robinson, Perceptual, supra note 31. 
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Muslims as terrorists, and would go on to defend neo-Nazis protestors 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, as “very fine people.”45  
Emerging evidence suggests that a silver lining of the Trump era is 
that some white Democrats “increasingly hold a perspective that 
acknowledges racism and discrimination as obstacles to Black 
success.”46 As one political scientist argues, news coverage of Trump’s 
hateful tweets and “[w]hite nationalist rallies may gain the most 
attention …. [b]ut this neglects the effects these events may have on the 
formation of more positive racial attitudes among those opposed to 
Trump and his administration.”47 Notably, shifts among white liberals 
may have narrowed the racial gap documented in Perceptual 
Segregation.48 Moreover, this evidence suggests growing diversity and 
 
 45 Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump Gives White Supremacists an 
Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/ 
us/politics/trump-charlottesville-white-nationalists.html; see supra text accompanying 
notes 16–23.  
 46 Andrew M. Engelhardt, Trumped by Race: Explanations for Race’s Influence on 
Whites’ Votes in 2016, 14 Q.J. POL. SCI. 313, 325 (2019). Other factors contributing to 
this shift may include a series of high-profile police shootings of unarmed black people 
and the Black Lives Matter movement. 
 47 Id.; see also The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/4-race-
immigration-and-discrimination/ (concluding that “Democrats . . . are increasingly 
likely to take racially liberal and pro-immigrant positions, while Republican views have 
remained relatively stable”); Thomas B. Edsall, Trump Is Changing the Shape of the 
Democratic Party, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
06/19/opinion/trump-racial-resentment.html; Eric Kaufmann, Americans are Divided by 
Their Views on Race, Not Race Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/03/18/opinion/race-america-trump.html. For example, although 
many Republicans and Democrats had expressed support for a border wall during 
previous decades, Trump’s pledge to build a wall has convinced more whites that the 
idea is racist. See Emily Ekins, Americans Used to Support a Border Wall. What Changed 
Their Minds?, CATO INST. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/ 
commentary/americans-used-support-border-wall-what-changed-their-minds [https:// 
perma.cc/M4PB-85WK]. 
 48 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 47 (finding that “in recent years the share of 
Hispanics and whites saying the country needs to continue making changes to give 
blacks equal rights with whites have grown significantly, narrowing the opinion gap 
with blacks”). In 2014, just 39% of whites agreed that the country needed to make 
further changes to provide equal rights for blacks. Id. By 2017, that number had climbed 
to 54%, and that change was predominantly driven by shifting views of white liberals. 
See id. Most strikingly, the Pew study found in 2017 that slightly more white Democrats 
than black Democrats (66% vs. 62%) reported that racial discrimination is the main 
reason why blacks cannot get ahead. Id. A recent study by Ian Haney-López found that 
whites, blacks, and Latino/a/x subjects were similarly likely to endorse a “racial fear” 
message calling for increased scrutiny of immigrants coming from “terrorist countries” 
and “places overrun with drugs and criminal gangs.” Ian Haney-López, Opinion, How 
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contestation among whites as to the prevalence of racism and the need 
for government to combat it.49  
This prefatory note warns readers to be conscious of how their own 
racial identity and socialization may predispose them to react to a thesis 
that implicates Justice Kennedy in white nationalism. To be sure — 
Spoiler Alert — this Essay cites no examples of Justice Kennedy uttering 
racial epithets or other evidence that would convince a staunch 
adherent of the colorblindness school. However, I hope to speak to 
white readers who are open to rethinking their assumptions about the 
prevalence of racial injustice. The Sommers and Norton study found 
that many white subjects did understand that whites have incentives to 
conceal their racist attitudes, which would suggest that requiring 
explicit evidence of bias in a judicial opinion will lead one to overlook 
significant bias.50  
To be clear, there are at least three analytical pathways that could lead 
one to link Justice Kennedy to white nationalism. First, recent equal 
 
to Beat Trump at His Own Game, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/debate-dog-whistle.html. Haney-López 
crafted a counter-message, which fused race and class, and found that this message 
appealed to subjects of diverse racial/ethnic backgrounds. Id. 
 49 See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 47. One example of this disaggregation is that some 
white moderate Democrats blamed catering to “identity politics” for Clinton’s loss to 
Trump. See, e.g., Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html. 
Many of these pundits have argued that the party needs to focus on winning back Rust 
Belt white voters, even though this too is a form of identity politics. See, e.g., Ronald 
Brownstein, Democrats Two Roads to Beating Trump, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/democrats-two-paths-beating-
trump-2020/583846/. By contrast, some of the Democratic presidential contenders 
(whites and people of color) are taking forceful stands on criminal justice and 
immigration, and even discussing concepts such as structural racism, reparations, and 
intersectionality, which may appeal not only to black and Latino/a/x voters but also 
race-conscious white voters. See, e.g., Matt Viser, Democrats Debate How Far Left Is Too 
Far Left as They Prepare to Take on Trump, WASH. POST (July 14, 2019, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-debate-how-far-left-is-too-far-
left/2019/07/14/deb8ce90-9f38-11e9-9ed4-c9089972ad5a_story.html. 
 50 See, e.g., Sommers & Norton, supra note 38, at 127 (finding that some of the most 
highly-rated evidence of bias was “[b]elieves Blacks are inferior but never says so 
publicly” and “[s]hares biased thoughts with white friends but not the public”). This 
Essay seeks to build on Jerome Culp’s claim that “we do [law] a disservice if we examine 
only the stated part of . . . judicial opinions. While various factors enter into the 
decision-making process, an individual judge may simply not state all the factors which 
motivate her towards a particular result. In addition to the arguments actually 
articulated, there is a ‘deep theory,’ what literary critics call the story.” Jerome McCristal 
Culp, Jr., Understanding the Racial Discourse of Justice Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 
597 (1994); see also id. at 599 (“Justice Rehnquist has reinserted a jurisprudential view 
of race which seems to draw upon old notions of white supremacy.”). 
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protection cases demand “smoking gun” evidence of malicious intent, 
which typically immunizes government against claims of racial 
discrimination.51 Justice Kennedy typically applied this exacting 
standard in race and sex cases brought by people of color and women 
and found no equal protection violation.52 I previously pointed out an 
inconsistency in Justice Kennedy’s equal protection jurisprudence.53 He 
sidestepped the malice test in sexual orientation cases, in order to 
accuse Congress of harboring “animus” toward gay and lesbian 
couples,54 and Colorado of enacting a constitutional amendment based 
on a “bare . . . desire to harm” gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.55 In 
neither of these majority opinions did Justice Kennedy marshal 
evidence of invective that would meet the malice test. Instead, he quietly 
lowered the bar, inferring bias based on his understanding of the 
relationship between the law and the social context.56 Ian Haney-López 
calls this model “contextual intent” and argues that it is a workable 
method for deciding equal protection cases.57 For purposes of this 
Essay, I draw on this animus/contextual intent approach — providing 
context that aspires to cast new light on Justice Kennedy’s reasoning. In 
essence, I judge Justice Kennedy by the same standard he applied to the 
government in the sexual orientation cases. This argument does turn on 
the reader being convinced that some form of bias (perhaps implicit bias 
or stereotyping) infected Justice Kennedy’s legal judgment.58 A third 
pathway, however, might avoid any reliance on animus or bias in 
intention, cognition, or attitude. From this perspective, even if Justice 
Kennedy felt warmly toward racial and religious minorities, the effect 
of his decision to acquiesce to white nationalism makes him culpable in 
its rise.59 
 
 51 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-19 (1987). 
 52 See Robinson, Unequal, supra note 7, at 198-204. 
 53 See id. at 166. 
 54 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770-72 (2013). 
 55 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 56 See Robinson, Unequal, supra note 7, at 170-72. 
 57 See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2012). 
 58 See Robinson, Unequal, supra note 7, at 185-86. 
 59 Here, it might be helpful to think about government decision-makers who stood 
by while Japanese-Americans were interned and Jews were massacred during the 
Holocaust. Some would argue that one can be complicit if he or she holds power and 
goes along with an atrocity even if he or she is sympathetic to the oppressed group. For 
instance, Representative Mark Takano stated in a speech on the floor of Congress: “How 
you react to the Muslim ban today is how you would have reacted to the imprisonment 
of my grandparents and parents 75 years ago [Japanese-Americans who were interned]. 
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In addition, I aim to encourage black readers, who may be used to 
seeing racial subordination in contexts such as criminal justice, voting 
rights, and education to notice how it also shapes doctrine in the 
contexts of immigration and national security. For example, the 
Supreme Court often resolves cases like Trump v. Hawaii by relying on 
the “plenary power doctrine,” which commits control over the nation’s 
borders to the President and Congress.60 Yet this doctrine was first 
articulated in cases that plainly turned on the exclusion of Chinese 
immigrants. The government deemed people of Chinese ancestry 
incapable of blending into a white-majority country.61 In my view, a 
Justice who simply relies on this precedent and chooses to overlook its 
racist underpinnings acquiesces to white nationalism.62 By reckoning 
with the white nationalist impulses in some of Justice Kennedy’s most 
lauded opinions, we can recognize the centrality of racial hierarchy in 
contemporary U.S. constitutional law, including a wide swath of 
immigration law — before and after Trump’s election. 
Finally, a reader might ask: Why focus on Justice Kennedy? And why 
these particular cases? Surely Justice Kennedy is not singularly 
responsible for the opinions that I critique — in general, he secured at 
least four other Justices’ votes. But Justice Kennedy has staked his 
reputation on neutrality, open-mindedness and being the “swing vote” 
unlike the other current Justices. More specifically, I focus on him 
because I fear that his prominent role in the sexual orientation cases 
will enable myth-making that frames him as more progressive than he 
actually was.63 This myth-making is perpetuated by the tendency of 
 
If you are silent today, you would have been silent then. If you are . . . complicit today, 
you would have been complicit then.” Representative Mark Takano, 1 Minute Speech 
on Recent Immigration Ban, C-SPAN (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?c4653641/rep-mark-takano-1-minute-speech-recent-immigration-ban. 
 60 See Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 8, at 203-04 (arguing that plenary power 
doctrine has “operated, for the most part, to insulate federal immigration statutes from 
developments in constitutional law for over a century”). See generally Natsu Taylor 
Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” 
Justification for On-going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 13-14 (2003). 
 61 See Saito, supra note 60, at 13-16 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)); see also 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory 
Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 528-29 
(2000). 
 62 It would be more difficult to make this claim about a lower court judge, because 
she may be constrained by the fear of being overruled for disregarding precedent. 
 63 Gabriel Chin’s work on Plessy v. Ferguson is an inspiration for this Essay. See 
Gabriel Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
151, 155-56 (1996). Chin argued that Justice Harlan’s defense of the rights of black 
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lawyers and constitutional law scholars to think and write along a 
“single axis” such as race or sexual orientation or immigration, but 
rarely all three. Doctrinal intersectionality is thus a vital tool in 
providing greater context and clarity in understanding a single line of 
cases. In this Essay, I focus on three streams of jurisprudence: sexual 
orientation, immigration, and national security. My argument is not 
that readers should roundly condemn Justice Kennedy and all of his 
opinions. Rather, we should situate the progressive aspects of his 
record64 alongside those that perpetuated white nationalism, and we 
should recognize the humanity, fallibility, and complexity of the Justice 
and the man. 
The story of gay and lesbian65 equality in the Supreme Court began 
with Justice Kennedy’s unexpected majority opinion in Romer v. Evans 
in 1996.66 The Romer majority ruled that a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that placed a special disability on lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people’s right to seek protection from the state was “inexplicable by 
anything but animus” — or a “bare . . . desire to harm”67 — “the class 
 
people and a “colorblind” Constitution overshadowed racist remarks and votes in 
several of his opinions addressing the rights of people of Chinese ancestry. See id. 
 64 For instances of Justice Kennedy’s progressive record, see, e.g., Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (striking down a state law that would 
have shut down many clinics that provide abortions); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214-15 (2016) (approving of a particular affirmative action program); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (holding that Congress violated the 
Suspension Clause in curtailing the availability of judicial review of the legality of 
detentions of alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay). I do not deny that these 
decisions required considerable courage and to some extent offer counter-evidence to 
my thesis. This intervention is an effort to make more central cases that have too often 
been hidden by the shadow of the few cases in which Justice Kennedy delivered a swing 
vote to the left. Moreover, we ought to situate each “victory” in their respective bodies 
of law, which continue to restrict race-conscious admissions decisions, permit many 
restrictions on women’s reproductive rights, and grant government much leeway to 
detain non-citizens. See Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, “Playing It Safe” with 
Empirical Evidence: Selective Use of Social Science in Supreme Court Cases About Racial 
Justice and Marriage Equality, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1568-69 (2018) [hereinafter 
Playing It Safe]. 
 65 I will generally refer to Justice Kennedy’s understanding of the relevant class as 
“gays and lesbians” in keeping with the framing of marriage equality litigators and the 
rhetoric in most of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. In referring to my own conception of the 
community, I generally use the more inclusive term “sexual minorities” or “LGBTQ.” 
See generally Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 
ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 218 n.13 (2018) [hereinafter Afterlife] (explaining the rationale for 
using these terms). 
 66 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 67 Id. at 632-35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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it affects.”68 Interestingly, Justice Kennedy began his majority opinion 
by citing a century-old case involving racial segregation. He wrote: 
[T]he first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the 
Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.” Unheeded then, those words now are understood to 
state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of 
persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this 
principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of 
Colorado’s Constitution.69 
Justice Kennedy thus linked Romer’s commencement of a gay and 
lesbian liberation project to the civil rights of black people and 
grounded both in the principle of state neutrality to individual rights. 
But he did so in a curious way.70 He cited the Plessy dissent as if Justice 
Harlan had firmly rebuked racial segregation and affirmed the full 
citizenship and equality of black people.71 However, even a cursory 
reading of Harlan’s dissent shows otherwise. Justice Harlan declared:  
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, 
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be 
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast 
to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste 
here.72 
Moreover, Justice Harlan objected that “a Chinaman can ride in the 
same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States” even 
though “the Chinese race” is “so different from our own that we do not 
 
 68 Id. at 632. 
 69 Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 70 Justice Kennedy followed a longstanding practice of gay and lesbian advocates of 
awkwardly seeking to link the rights of sexual minorities to those of racial minorities. 
See generally Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1010 (2014) [hereinafter Postracialism] (critiquing activists and litigators for rhetoric 
supplanting racial minorities in favor of sexual minorities and minimizing the 
persistence of racial subordination); Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, LGBT 
Equality and Sexual Racism, 86 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2739 (2018) (discussing gay and 
lesbian litigants’ reliance on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 71 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 72 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.”73 
Justice Kennedy never acknowledged the disconnect between Justice 
Harlan’s rhetoric approving of white supremacy, including his claim 
that Chinese immigrants are unworthy of citizenship, and Justice 
Harlan’s vote to invalidate a state law requiring racial separation in 
railroad travel. In relying on Justice Harlan’s views, and declining to 
disavow his racism, Justice Kennedy perhaps inadvertently planted a 
seed of white nationalism in an opinion widely regarded as a 
pathbreaking advance for sexual minorities.74  
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s handiwork shares a related dissonance. 
Romer is representative of several of Justice Kennedy’s opinions in that it 
pairs soaring, aspirational language with his complicity in ongoing social 
stratification.75 I will argue that white nationalism persisted as an 
undercurrent in Justice Kennedy’s subsequent cases concerning sexual 
orientation, family formation, and the right to marry and then became 
most manifest in a series of national security opinions. This critical lens 
reveals that, notwithstanding his flowery rhetoric, for Justice Kennedy, 
constitutional liberty does not in fact extend equally and neutrally to all.76 
 
 73 Id. at 561. 
 74 See infra text accompanying note 209 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s argument in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop that a judge who fails to disavow religious bias expressed by a 
different decision-maker shares in that bias). 
 75 See, e.g., Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629-38 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
(declining to find that an amendment to a state constitution prohibiting affirmative 
action violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 374-76 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court’s decision 
to bar federal suits by people with disabilities to recover money damages for a state’s 
failure to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 76 Justice Kennedy has often described neutrality as a critical requirement for 
judges. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (referring to “the 
judicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions, 
without scornful or disparaging commentary”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (discussing how 
the Equal Protection Clause enforces the concept of the law’s neutrality). My argument 
challenges those who have argued that cases like Romer reflect a neutral principle that 
applies beyond sexual minorities. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal 
Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 243-45 (arguing that combining racial-
purpose and animus standards creates a framework for maintaining judicial neutrality 
beyond minority-centered cases); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 
13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 257-58 (1996) (arguing that Romer represents a “pariah 
principle,” which “forbids the government from designating any societal group as 
untouchable, regardless of whether the group in question is generally entitled to some 
degree of judicial protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like left-handers 
(or, under current doctrine, homosexuals)”). For a full discussion of what I have called 
Justice Kennedy’s “LGBT exceptionalism,” see generally Robinson, Unequal, supra note 
7. To say that these cases are specific to the context of sexual minorities is not to argue 
that they were wrongly decided. My argument instead is that the Court has failed to 
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I. WHITE NATIONALISM IN FAMILY FORMATION CASES 
This Part analyzes cases that concern the boundaries of family and the 
government’s willingness to recognize family bonds. The first set 
concerns whether U.S. citizens who decline to marry a sexual partner 
of another nationality can transmit their citizenship to a child of that 
unmarried relationship who is born outside of the United States. The 
second set of cases addresses the extent to which the Court regards 
people in same-sex relationships as entitled to the same protections, 
responsibilities, and rights as male-female married couples and their 
children. 
A. Nguyen v. INS 
In three cases that spanned twenty of Justice Kennedy’s thirty years 
on the Supreme Court, the Justices struggled with whether Congress 
can impose different conditions on the ability of U.S. citizen men and 
women to transmit citizenship to children born outside the United 
States to unmarried parents.77 I focus on the second of these three cases 
because Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. In closing this 
discussion, I explain how the other two cases flesh out Justice 
Kennedy’s stance on family formation that crosses national borders.  
Nguyen v. INS is primarily thought of as a gender discrimination case, 
but a closer look suggests that a desire to maintain the nation’s racial 
demographics seemingly drove the majority’s gender discrimination 
analysis. Doctrinal intersectionality urges us to see how law may 
simultaneously construct gender roles, shape race, and sculpt nation-
building.78 In Nguyen, Justice Kennedy upheld a federal law 
determining the transmission of citizenship against a Fifth Amendment 
equal protection challenge.79 The statute imposed different 
requirements on unmarried U.S. citizen fathers and mothers for 
conferring citizenship to their children born outside of the United States 
with a noncitizen.80 A mother had to show that she had U.S. citizenship 
at the time that she gave birth and also that she had prior physical 
 
extend their underlying principles to equally compelling contexts, such as the 
discrimination embodied in Trump’s travel ban. See infra Part III. 
 77 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017); Nguyen v. INS, 533 
U.S. 53, 56 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998). 
 78 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss 
of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 409, 456-58 (2005). 
 79 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-59. 
 80 See id. at 59-60 (describing the different requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) 
and § 1409(c)). 
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presence in the United States for a continuous year.81 Fathers, however, 
had to establish a blood relationship by clear and convincing evidence, 
legitimate the child through a judicial procedure, and prove that they 
had agreed to provide financial support while the child was a minor.82  
A straightforward application of intermediate scrutiny to this gender 
classification would have required the Court to invalidate the law.83 In 
doing the opposite and upholding the law, the Nguyen majority mangled 
intermediate scrutiny until it was unrecognizable. Its notable departures 
include Justice Kennedy inventing a rationale that the government itself 
did not advance: “the opportunity for a meaningful relationship 
between citizen parent and child.”84 Such hypothesized rationales are 
supposed to be out of bounds when applying intermediate scrutiny.85 
Second, although the application of intermediate scrutiny was intended 
to disrupt lawmakers’ tendency to rely on gender stereotypes, the 
Nguyen majority reinforced the view that women are natural nurturers 
— and thus law should make it easier for them to transmit citizenship 
to their children.86  
By contrast to mothers, Justice Kennedy imagined men in the military 
and male business travelers as sexually reckless and unlikely to desire a 
relationship with their offspring.87 Justice Kennedy went out of his way 
to express special concern about the potential for military deployment 
to expand the ranks of American citizens.88 He noted that in 1969, 
during the Vietnam War, and the year in which Nguyen was born, there 
were approximately one million military personnel stationed abroad, 
nearly all of whom were male.89 He went on to state:  
 
 81 See id. 
 82 See id.; see also id. at 80 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id. at 79-80 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But see id. at 60-61 (majority opinion). 
Since the 1970s, the Court has applied a heightened level of review, “intermediate 
scrutiny,” when a law classifies on the basis of sex or gender. Under this standard, the 
government must provide an important state interest, and the law must be substantially 
related to that interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
 84 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-65; see also id. at 67-68 (“Statements from the 
government’s brief are not conclusive as to the objects of the statute . . . as we are 
concerned with the objectives of Congress, not those of the INS. We ascertain the 
purpose of a statute by drawing logical conclusions from its text, structure, and 
operation.”). 
 85 See id. at 84 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 86 See id. at 88-89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 65-67 (majority opinion). 
 88 See id. at 65 (“One concern in this context has always been with young people, 
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.”).  
 89 See id. (citing DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS 48, 74 (1999); DEP’T 
OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS 29 (1970)). 
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The ease of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit 
foreign countries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that 
must be of real concern…. Congress is well within its authority 
in refusing . . . to commit this country to embracing a child as a 
citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United 
States, to the absolute right to enter its borders, and to full 
participation in the political process.90 
Although the majority of men affected (those in the military and 
business travelers) were likely white men, the opinion suggests that it 
was significant that the Court imagined their progeny as biracial 
children likely to have difficulty assimilating into American social and 
political values. Justice Kennedy expressed concern about “the realities 
of the child’s own ties and allegiances.”91 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion can be read to codify a “boys will be boys” social norm 
that makes it easy for American men to leave their foreign-born children 
(of color) and exclude them from the national polity.92  
The inference that race played a factor in Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Nguyen opinion is bolstered by an analysis of his votes in two related 
cases. From 1998 to 2017, the Court wrestled with the constitutionality 
of gender distinctions in legal rules determining the transmission of 
citizenship. Over the course of the three cases, Justice Kennedy’s 
position on the core doctrinal question dramatically vacillated. In the 
first case, Miller v. Albright,93 he joined a concurring opinion by Justice 
O’Connor.94 This concurrence considered it as significant that the 
petitioner, a woman who was born in the Philippines, was seeking 
citizenship without the benefit of her American father petitioning 
alongside her. Justice O’Connor argued that the statute discriminated 
against the father, not the daughter, even though the daughter was the 
person denied U.S. citizenship.95 If the father had not dropped his case, 
Justice O’Connor suggested that she likely would have ruled in his favor 
because “[i]t is unlikely, in my opinion, that any gender classifications 
based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny.”96 Justice 
O’Connor admitted that the Court possessed the authority to permit the 
 
 90 Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added). 
 91 Id. at 67. 
 92 Cf. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 23 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 561, 
581 (2002) [hereinafter The Citizen] (“[R]ace and other markers appear and reappear 
to patrol the borders of belonging to political communities.”). 
 93 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
 94 Id. at 445 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. at 445-46 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 96 See id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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daughter to litigate her father’s equal protection right, yet for 
“prudential” reasons, she refused to follow this route.97  
When the Court decided Nguyen three years later, a case that did not 
implicate such prudential concerns, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
embraced arguments that Justice Stevens had articulated in Miller to 
deny the equal protection challenge, leaving Justice O’Connor to write 
a fiery dissent.98 Nearly twenty years later, the Court returned to this 
issue in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.99 This time, Justice Ginsburg wrote 
for the majority and found an equal protection violation, and Justice 
Kennedy joined her opinion.100 But there was a catch. The majority 
decided that Congress would prefer the Court to fix the gender inequity 
by making it harder for mothers to transmit citizenship.101 As a result, 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion did not grant U.S. citizenship to a single 
person.  
It is virtually impossible to reconcile Justice Kennedy’s substantive 
positions in these cases — he seemingly found an equal protection 
violation; then he didn’t; and then he did! However, we can understand 
this flip-flopping by identifying the thread that connects all three of the 
opinions that Justice Kennedy wrote or joined: he consistently voted to 
deny citizenship to the person of color (a Filipina, a man of Vietnamese 
descent, and a Puerto-Rican/Dominican man). Moreover, this trilogy 
shows how at times Justice Kennedy masked likely substantive 
resistance to individual rights underneath procedural justifications, a 
theme that recurs in his national security opinions, discussed below.102 
In sum, Justice Kennedy’s Nguyen opinion and votes in all three cases 
advanced white nationalism by effectively establishing a higher bar for 
people of color to be recognized as U.S. citizens. The opinion reified a 
patriarchal legal rule that allows mostly male and mostly white business 
and military travelers to engage in sexual intercourse without bearing 
 
 97 Id. at 445-46. (O’Connor, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Breyer strongly 
disputed these prudential considerations. See id. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 98 Compare id. at 444 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing 
that “fathers are less likely than mothers to have the opportunity to develop 
relationships”), and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65-68 (2001) (contending that mothers 
are more likely than fathers to form meaningful relationships with children), with id. at 
84 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s argument as hypothetical 
rationale that is unsubstantiated by concrete facts). 
 99 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 100 Id. at 1685-86. 
 101 Id. at 1700-01.  
 102 See infra notes 167–175 and accompanying text. 
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the legal risk that their children may attain citizenship and follow them 
to the United States without their permission.103 
B. United States v. Windsor & Obergefell v. Hodges 
In 2013 and 2015, the Court decided its two most famous marriage 
equality cases, United States v. Windsor104 and Obergefell v. Hodges,105 
and Justice Kennedy wrote both majority opinions. Many scholars have 
critiqued the respectability politics that fueled the decision-making of 
LGBTQ rights and marriage equality movement lawyers.106 My prior 
writings have trained their fire primarily on the lawyers, who assumed 
that Justice Kennedy could support marriage equality only if they 
airbrushed gay and lesbian identity to make it resemble someone from 
Justice Kennedy’s background who just happened to be gay or lesbian 
because of a genetic quirk.107 In a recent piece, David M. Frost and I 
lamented what might have been if movement lawyers had embraced 
inclusion, rather than exclusion.108 With virtual uniformity, the 
movement’s briefs recited “gays and lesbians” as the relevant class, even 
though bisexual, transgender, and other sexual and gender minorities 
also stood to benefit from marriage equality.109 The lawyers selected 
plaintiffs who were likely to appeal to the Justices in that they were 
disproportionately white and middle- or upper-class.110 For example, 
 
 103 Recall that under the legal rule validated in Nguyen the father must take action to 
legally recognize and support the child in order for his child to obtain citizenship. This 
rule lets the U.S. father determine whether or not the U.S. embraces his offspring. See 
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70-71. 
 104 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 105 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 106 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS 811, 834-35 
(2013) (discussing race and sexual orientation in relation to gay rights advocacy); 
Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2004) (discussing how nonnormative sexual practices are 
relegated to a second tier within the context of gay rights advocacy); Cynthia Godsoe, 
Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136, 140-41 (2015) (explaining how the intersection 
of race, class, and sexuality has been overlooked in the context of same-sex marriage); 
Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 387, 435 (2012) (arguing that the marriage equality movement has failed to 
build bridges with groups that have been marginalized due to race and gender); 
Robinson, Postracialism, supra note 70 (discussing how the mainstream gay and lesbian 
community has a tense relationship with racial minorities, bisexual and transgender 
people). 
 107 See, e.g., Robinson & Frost, Afterlife, supra note 65, at 224–26. 
 108 See Robinson & Frost, Playing It Safe, supra note 64, at 1602. 
 109 Id. at 1593-94. 
 110 See Robinson & Frost, Afterlife, supra note 65, at 224-25. 
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one lawyer argued that a same-sex couple who filed for bankruptcy 
would be a bad representative of the LGBTQ community.111 Of the 
plaintiffs in Obergefell, 83% were white, compared to 67% of the LGBTQ 
community.112 While 24% of the LGBTQ community makes less than 
$24,000 in income, none of the Obergefell plaintiffs fell into this 
category.113 This centering of white, affluent plaintiffs unnecessarily 
perpetuated perceptions that marriage equality is a white, 
assimilationist project.114  
There is little text in Obergefell and Windsor that explicitly adopts 
these racial and class boundaries.115 One could argue that the lawyers 
imposed these identity-based limits on the framing of the marriage 
equality claim, and Justice Kennedy is not to blame. Still Obergefell in 
particular is notable for its emphasis on citizenship. The majority 
opinion provided four main reasons for extending the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.116 The fourth and final reason linked marriage to 
national identity.117 Justice Kennedy opined that “this Court’s cases and 
the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our 
social order.”118 He continued: “Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this 
truth on his travels through the United States almost two centuries ago 
[stating]: ‘There is certainly no country in the world where the tie of 
marriage is so much respected as in America.’”119 Quoting Maynard v. 
Hill,120 Justice Kennedy asserted that marriage is “the foundation of the 
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization 
nor progress.’ Marriage, the Maynard Court said, has long been ‘a great 
 
 111 Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife. 
 112 Godsoe, supra note 106, at 139 fig.1.  
 113 Id.  
 114 See Robinson & Frost, Playing It Safe, supra note 64, at 1602. 
 115 Surely some scholars would castigate the entire marriage equality project as 
animated by white respectability, which perhaps is a cousin of white nationalism. Cf. 
Murray, supra note 106, at 416. But there is scant text in the key opinions that expressly 
affirms this reading. Thus, it is critical to look beyond the context of marriage equality, 
which I do below. See infra Part I.C. 
 116 “These four benefits are the following: (1) marriage as an expression of personal 
autonomy, (2) marriage as a unique opportunity, (3) marriage as a means of protecting 
children and family, and (4) marriage as a central social institution.” Robinson & Frost, 
Playing It Safe, supra note 64, at 1586 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2599-01 (2015)). 
 117 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 309 (Henry Reeve 
trans., rev. ed. 1990) (1835)). 
 120 125 U.S. 190 (1888).  
  
1052 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:1027 
public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.’” 121 
Obergefell shows that Justice Kennedy understood marriage to be 
central to citizenship, belonging, and nation-building. Moreover, 
Justice Kennedy regarded marriage equality as a means of incorporating 
a subset of gays and lesbians (those willing and able to marry) into the 
polity. For instance, he declared that “[i]t demeans gays and lesbians 
for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s 
society.”122 He observed that the Court’s Lawrence opinion, which 
decriminalized sex between men and sex between women, did not 
confer full citizenship on gays and lesbians: “Outlaw to outcast may be 
a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”123 In 
sum, the marriage equality cases link marriage to citizenship and 
through the focus on particular plaintiffs arguably link same-sex 
marriage and whiteness. Further, Obergefell ties marriage to civilization 
and implies that the “uncivilized” reside outside the West.124 Justice 
Kennedy’s position in Kerry v. Din provides further support for this 
claim. 
C. Kerry v. Din 
Just ten days before the Court decided Obergefell, it announced its 
decision in Kerry v. Din, a largely overlooked right-to-marry case.125 
Fauzia Din is a U.S. citizen who came to the United States from 
Afghanistan as a refugee.126 Din petitioned the U.S. government to have 
her husband, Kanishka Berashk, a resident citizen of Afghanistan, 
classified as an “immediate relative,” in order for him to receive priority 
 
 121 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211, 213). 
 122 Id. at 2602. Windsor even more strongly condemned the effort to stigmatize gays 
and lesbians, although it did not expressly mention citizenship. See United States v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770-72 (2013). By contrast, Obergefell undermined its anti-
subordination rationale by broadly deeming opponents of same-sex marriage to be 
reasonable people of good faith. See Robinson & Frost, Playing It Safe, supra note 108, 
at 1588 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594).  
 123 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 124 Id. at 2601 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville “[t]here is certainly no country in the 
world where the tie of marriage is so much respected as in America…”). Justice 
Kennedy’s use of the de Tocqueville quote about other countries could be read to imply 
that countries that do not value marriage in the same way that Americans do and are 
thus “less civilized.” 
 125 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: 
Obergefell, Din, and the Future of Constitutional Family Law, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 
505-06 (2018) (arguing that “neither Obergefell nor Din can be understood without the 
other,” yet Din has generally been overlooked). 
 126 Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2132.  
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in his application for a visa.127 After the government denied her 
husband’s visa application, Din argued that the failure to provide a 
detailed reason for the denial violated her due process right to live in 
the United States with her spouse.128 The Ninth Circuit held that Din 
had a “protected liberty interest in marriage that entitled [her] to review 
of [her] spouse’s visa.”129 In a snide plurality opinion, Justice Scalia 
flatly declared that there is no such constitutional right.130 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which Justice Alito joined, concurred in 
the judgment. Unlike the plurality and Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justice 
Kennedy refused to decide whether Din had a protected liberty interest 
arising from her marriage.131 He concluded that, assuming that Din had 
such an interest, “Din received all the process to which she was 
entitled.”132 All the Court’s precedent required, Justice Kennedy opined, 
was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” and courts may “neither 
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification against” a citizen’s constitutional right.133 In short, Justice 
Kennedy gave no weight to Din’s interest in living together with her 
husband in America.134 He concluded that “respect for the political 
branches’ broad power over the creation and administration of the 
immigration system” counsels against requiring the government to 
disclose the underlying facts and allowing Din to challenge them.135  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence declined even to discuss Din’s 
personal stake in the visa decision — that is, how enforced separation 
from her husband would impact the integrity of their union. In 
Obergefell, by contrast, Justice Kennedy carefully detailed the interests 
of five of the petitioners (all of them white, even though the group of 
petitioners included some people of color) to “illustrate the urgency of 
their cause.”136 He considered and ultimately dismissed the argument 
that the Court should defer to the democratic process: “when the rights 
 
 127 See id. at 2131-32. 
 128 Id. at 2131-32 (“A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible 
under § 1182(a)(3)(B) [which broadly proscribes people who are connected to terrorist 
organizations] but provided no further explanation.”).  
 129 Id. at 2132 (quoting Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 130 Id. at 2131. Scalia referred to Din’s arguments as “absurd,” and argued that 
precedent “protecting ‘the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom’ . . . do[es] not 
plausibly extend into the offices of our consulates abroad.” Id. at 2133, 2138.  
 131 Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 2140 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)). 
 134 See id. at 2140-41. 
 135 Id. at 2141. 
 136 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594-95 (2015). 
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of persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ 
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decision 
making. . . . This holds true even when protecting individual rights 
affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.”137  
Windsor similarly involved the question of deference. The Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) was passed by Congress and signed by 
President Bill Clinton, and concerned the executive branch’s 
administration of thousands of benefits to individuals based on a narrow 
definition of marriage.138 Justice Kennedy considered a challenge by 
Edith Windsor — an affluent, white woman who had to pay more than 
$350,000 in estate taxes because the federal government refused to treat 
her marriage to a woman as legitimate — and Justice Kennedy found 
her claim compelling.139 By contrast in Din, Nguyen, and the national 
security cases discussed below, the people whose rights were at issue 
were mostly people of color (predominantly Asian and Middle-Eastern), 
non-Christians (often people who were Muslim or perceived as Muslims 
because of their racial identities), and they were either not U.S. citizens 
or their asserted citizenship was the subject of dispute (Nguyen). Leti 
Volpp describes how people in these groups “are always already 
assumed to come from elsewhere, and to belong elsewhere when their 
behavior affronts.”140 Far from challenging such social hierarchies, 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence reflexively entrenched them. When 
Windsor and Obergefell are placed alongside cases like Nguyen and Din, 
we can see that Din’s and Nguyen’s identities as racial and/or religious 
minorities provide a plausible explanation for the absence of empathy 
in Justice Kennedy analysis, a conspicuous contrast to the “dignity” he 
afforded Windsor and Obergefell. 
II. WHITE NATIONALISM IN JUSTICE KENNEDY’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
OPINIONS 
This Part explores Justice Kennedy’s opinions in two cases decided in 
the post-September 11 context. These cases make manifest the troubling 
tendency of Justice Kennedy’s avowed commitment to individual liberty 
to crumble when confronted with claims of sweeping executive 
authority. 
 
 137 Id. at 2605 (citing Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014)). 
 138 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2013)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744 (2013).  
 139 See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753-54, 775. 
 140 Volpp, The Citizen, supra note 92, at 582 n.84. 
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A. Iqbal v. Ashcroft 
In Iqbal v. Ashcroft,141 Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim man of Pakistani descent 
who had lived and worked in the United States for ten years, was 
captured in an immigration roundup weeks after the attack on the Twin 
Towers.142 He alleged that while confined in the Metropolitan Detention 
Center in Brooklyn, New York, his jailors “‘kicked him in the stomach, 
punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell without 
justification, subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches 
when he posed no safety risk to himself and others, and refused to let 
him and other Muslims pray because there would be ‘[n]o prayer for 
terrorists.’”143 After his release, Iqbal argued that John Ashcroft, the 
former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, then 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “adopted an 
unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh conditions 
of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.”144  
Justice Kennedy, writing for five Justices, held that the complaint 
failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”145 He 
expounded: “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible 
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”146 He then applied this new test to Iqbal’s case: 
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim 
hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing 
of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was 
headed by another Arab Muslim — Osama bin Laden — and 
composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should 
come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their 
suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of 
the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts 
respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely 
lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain 
 
 141 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 142 Id. at 666; see also Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 394-
97 (2017). 
 143 Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009) (citing Complaint for Respondent at 
113, 143-45, 154, Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 144 Id. at 666. 
 145 Id. at 678, 680 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007)). 
 146 Id. at 679. 
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aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who 
had potential connections to those who committed terrorist 
acts. As between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the 
arrests, . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination 
respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible 
conclusion.147 
This passage presents the detentions as “self-evidently” legitimate, 
which eliminated any need to consult evidence.148 As Shirin Sinnar 
argues, this critical passage is susceptible to two interpretations, both of 
which are problematic.149 First, one could read it to say that “the 
detentions were based on specific information that tied individuals to 
terrorism without any reference to race or religion, and that the 
detentions merely affected mostly Arabs or Muslims because members 
of those groups were disproportionately involved in al Qaeda terrorism 
or disproportionately likely to know the hijackers.”150 However, such a 
conclusion would require supporting evidence, rather than mere faith 
in the innocent motives of law enforcement. In fact, the available 
evidence undercuts this good faith assumption. The Justice 
Department’s Inspector General concluded that the “leads that resulted 
in the arrest of a September 11 detainee often were quite general in 
nature,”151 such as a person viewing it as suspicious that their Arab 
neighbor kept odd hours.152 For example, according to Human Rights 
Watch, a Somali man attracted suspicion for praying in public; and an 
Egyptian man was detained after he asked a police officer for 
directions.153 Moreover, government policy was to arrest 
undocumented people encountered while investigating a tip — even 
when the person was not the target of the tip.154 Justice Kennedy had 
 
 147 Id. at 682. 
 148 See Sinnar, supra note 142, at 382. 
 149 See id. at 389-90. 
 150 Id. at 389. 
 151 Id. at 420 (quoting OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION 
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 16 
(2003), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0306/full.pdf). 
 152 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 16 (2003), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES]. 
 153 Sinnar, supra note 142, at 420 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF 
GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 12-15 (2002)). For other 
examples, see SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 152, at 16-17. 
 154 See SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 152, at 15. 
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these facts before him when he decided Iqbal. He even cited the 
Inspector General’s report describing the investigative process that led 
to detentions of people like Iqbal.155 He made no effort to square the 
Inspector General’s report with his blithe confidence that the detentions 
were legitimate and that Iqbal’s claim of bias was implausible. 
These accounts are reminiscent of the now widely discussed 
experience of “driving while black” and “driving while brown” — the 
phenomenon of people of color drawing police scrutiny for engaging in 
common daily acts such as driving. In the last few years, in the wake of 
the Black Lives Matter movement, black people have gone viral by 
recording and sharing their accounts of white people calling the police 
on them for trying to use a restroom in a Starbucks, talking on the 
phone in a hotel lobby, barbequing in a park, and checking out of an 
AirBnB rental, to name just a few examples.156 In cases seeking to 
challenge racially-motivated stops by the police outside the context of 
terrorism or immigration, Justice Kennedy has generally voted with the 
majority to make it nearly impossible for people of color to show 
constitutional violations.157 
Surely a judge hearing Iqbal’s case could have examined the evidence 
and reasonably concluded that the FBI relied on racially-tainted “tips” 
in many cases rather than specific and objective evidence that the 
detainees were linked to terrorism. Eight years after Iqbal, Justice 
 
 155 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009). 
 156 See, e.g., Gianluca Mezzofiore, A White Woman Called Police on Black People 
Barbecuing. This is How the Community Responded, CNN (May 22, 2018, 3:25 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/us/white-woman-black-people-oakland-bbq-trnd/index. 
html; Matt Stevens, Starbucks C.E.O. Apologizes After Arrests of 2 Black Men, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/15/us/starbucks-philadelphia-black-
men-arrest.html; Daniel Victor, A Woman Said She Saw Burglars. They Were Just Black 
Airbnb Guests, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/ 
us/airbnb-black-women-police.html; Mihir Zaveri, Doubletree in Portland Fires 2 
Employees After Kicking Out Black Man Who Made Call From Lobby, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/us/black-man-kicked-out-hotel-portland. 
html; see also Melissa Gomez, Babysitting While Black: Georgia Man Was Stalked by 
Woman as He Cared for 2 White Children, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/us/black-man-babysitting.html?module=inline; 
Kristine Phillips, A Black Lawmaker Was Canvassing Door to Door in Her District. A 
Constituent Called 911, WASH. POST (July 6, 2018, 5:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/07/05/a-black-lawmaker-was-campaigning-door-to-door-
in-her-district-a-constituent-called-911/?utm_term=.8c2e3d420480. 
 157 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353-54 (2001) (joining 
Justice Souter’s opinion granting police broad discretion to arrest drivers for minor 
offenses); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (joining opinion by Justice 
Scalia holding that police officer’s actual motivation for stopping a motorist, including 
a racial motive, was irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment). 
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Kennedy acknowledged this form of potential bias in Ziglar v. Abbasi, a 
related September 11 detainee case: “[s]ome tips were based on well-
grounded suspicion of terrorist activity, but many others may have been 
based on fear of Arabs and Muslims.”158 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy found 
implausible the allegation of bias by high-level officials (Mueller and 
Ashcroft), yet seemingly was more open to the possibility of bias among 
low-ranking officials. Neither opinion fully explains Justice Kennedy’s 
divergent assumptions about the potential for bias among high- vs. low-
ranking law enforcement. Ultimately, Abbasi found additional reasons 
to deny detainees opportunities for relief.159 
Second, the Iqbal majority opinion might have concluded “that even 
if law enforcement officials did take into account ethnicity and religion 
in their investigation, such considerations were legitimate because of 
the ethnic and religious composition of the hijackers and al Qaeda.”160 
Simply being an “Arab Muslim” might have provided the “potential 
connection[] to those who committed terrorist acts” that Justice 
Kennedy perceived as “obvious.”161 If this is true, Justice Kennedy’s 
reasoning effectively endorsed racial profiling in the war on terror.162 
Sinnar argues: “the Court treated the mass detentions as banal — as if 
it were entirely natural that horrific violence committed by nineteen 
men should generate suspicion of thousands of others who shared (or 
appeared to share) their broadly defined racial or religious identity.” 163 
And if targeting “Arab Muslims” is a valid investigative tool for catching 
 
 158 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2017). 
 159 See infra text accompanying note 178-193. 
 160 Sinnar, supra note 142, at 389-90.  
 161 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). Leti Volpp has shown that 
September 11 “facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups 
together persons who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’ and associates them 
with terrorism.” Volpp, The Citizen, supra note 92, at 562. This logic is particularly 
vexing as applied to Iqbal because he is not Arab. He is Pakistani. See Sinnar, supra note 
142, at 414. But this difference seemed not to matter to Justice Kennedy, who appeared 
to conflate Arabs and Muslims. See id. (“Most Muslims are not Arab, and most Arab-
Americans are not Muslim, but the Justices conflated the two groups as readily as the 
U.S. public after September 11.”) See also id. at 416-17. Justice Souter made the same 
error. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 162 It is true that Justice Kennedy concludes the passage by stating that “purposeful, 
invidious discrimination . . . is not a plausible conclusion.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. 
However, this might simply mean that because targeting “Arab Muslims” was rational 
in the post 9-11 context, such racial/religious targeting was not “invidious.”  
 163 Sinnar, supra note 142, at 429; see also Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and 
Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for 
Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 496 (2010) (comparing Iqbal to 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  
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terrorists, wouldn’t stopping “Latino looking people” be a legitimate 
way of finding undocumented immigrants? Wouldn’t stopping black 
drivers be a reasonable means of catching drug dealers? Iqbal’s 
susceptibility to this reading extends a body of Fourth Amendment law 
that consistently turns a blind eye to law enforcement practices that link 
race and criminality.164 And lower courts have cited Iqbal’s musing on 
identity and policing to justify stopping people based on race during 
routine criminal investigations.165 My argument need not turn solely on 
which interpretation Justice Kennedy subjectively intended. Rather 
than depending on an inquiry into what was in his “heart,”166 one can 
blame Justice Kennedy for drafting language that can reasonably be read 
as an endorsement of racial profiling and failing to repudiate that 
interpretation in subsequent opinions. Lower courts’ reliance on the 
racial profiling interpretation demonstrates the real-world 
consequences of this incendiary passage.167  
Moreover, Iqbal’s “plausibility” test inflicts widespread harm beyond 
the policing and immigration context.168 It deters claims by plaintiffs 
alleging discrimination by encouraging judges to turn to their personal 
 
 164 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (validating 
mass questioning of African-American men and women after crime victim identified an 
African-American man as the perpetrator); Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black 
People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 125, 125 (2017); see also R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection 
and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1075 
(2001). 
 165 See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(describing Iqbal as “instructive in [the] analysis of the legitimacy of the City’s” policy 
targeting black men). 
 166 The same point applies to Trump’s embrace of white nationalism, which might 
be strategic. Cf. KAUFMANN, supra note 10, at 116 (“It’s not entirely clear if Trump 
sincerely believes in immigration restriction or merely found it a useful tool to acquire 
the presidency.”); id. at 93 (noting that in the ’90s, Trump lambasted rival Pat Buchanan 
as racist toward blacks, anti-Semitic, and anti-gay). 
 167 In cases concerning racial classifications, such as affirmative action, Justice 
Kennedy often inveighed against policies that rely on racial stereotypes. See, e.g., 
Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. 291, 308 (2014) (plurality opinion). Sadly, the key passage 
in Iqbal disregards these warnings. Each year, 1L students in many law schools read and 
discuss Iqbal as part of the core civil procedure curriculum. Yet professors often do not 
call it out for wrongly legitimizing racial profiling. This failure creates a risk that new 
lawyers will come to regard racial profiling as self-evidently legal and uncontroversial. 
 168 See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 
VA. L. REV. 2117, 2170-71 (2015) (concluding that Iqbal “has brought increased 
inequality, reduced access to justice, and provided little measurable benefit” and that 
“plausibility pleading is associated with decreased access to justice for individuals, often 
to the benefit of corporations and governmental entities”).  
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experience, which is likely to be shaped by their privileged identities.169 
As noted in the introduction, social science has documented substantial 
differences among racial groups as to their cognitive frameworks for 
perceiving discrimination.170 For example, a black person might 
reasonably infer discrimination based on facts that would not persuade 
the average white observer.171 Yet Justice Kennedy glided past these 
social fissures and affirmed a belief in a unitary judicial “common 
sense.” Empirical studies suggest that Iqbal’s heightened standard has 
been particularly detrimental to civil rights and employment 
discrimination claims, as well as claims brought by prisoners.172 
The lens of doctrinal intersectionality helps us see how this intuitive 
approach to ascertaining discrimination spread from the sexual 
orientation context in Romer in 1996 to discrimination claims generally 
more than ten years later in Iqbal. As Justice Scalia suggested in his 
Romer dissent, the majority opinion overflowed rhetorically but 
contained scant doctrinal analysis.173 For example, Justice Kennedy did 
not significantly analyze the adequacy of the state’s asserted interests en 
route to his conclusion that the law was motivated by “animus” against 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.174 Iqbal’s “plausibility” standard 
extends this intuition-based approach beyond the context of equal 
protection sexual orientation claims to constitutional and statutory 
claims asserting discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and sexual 
orientation (and well beyond the context of discrimination).  
This is concerning in part because the federal judiciary remains 
predominantly white and male.175 Indeed, President Trump’s 
 
 169 See Robinson, Perceptual, supra note 31, at 1153-56 (arguing that anti-
discrimination law reflects an “insider bias”). 
 170 See id. at 1127-28. 
 171 See, e.g., id. at 1096-97. 
 172 See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 168, at 2146-47, 2157. 
 173 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
Justice Kennedy’s “heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial 
holdings”); see also Farber & Sherry, supra note 76, at 257 (noting that many 
constitutional law scholars argue that “Romer cannot mean what it says,” and stating, 
“[t]he [Romer] Court explicitly avoided the most doctrinally plausible grounds for 
invalidating Colorado’s ban on anti-discrimination protections for homosexuals”). 
 174 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
 175 Data from the Federal Judicial Center show that of sitting Article III judges (both 
active and senior), 60% are white and male. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal 
Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/biographical-directory-
article-iii-federal-judges-export (last visited February 17, 2019). The same data show 
that Trump-appointed judges are 70% white and male. Id.; see also Carrie Johnson & 
Renee Klahr, Trump Is Reshaping the Judiciary. A Breakdown by Race, Gender and 
Qualification, NPR (Nov. 15, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/15/ 
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unprecedented success at filling judicial vacancies means that 
increasingly white, conservative, Christian-identified, male, and 
heterosexual judges will consult their personal experience in order to 
dismiss discrimination claims brought by people of color, women, 
sexual and gender minorities, and religious minorities. To be sure, long 
before Iqbal, Justices and judges looked to their own life experiences in 
order to understand and assess legal claims.176 For example, the Plessy 
majority did this in asserting that racial segregation did not imply black 
inferiority.177 Iqbal, however, makes this worrisome tendency a formal 
part of a legal gate-keeping test. Instead of viewing one’s personal 
background as a source of insight but also potential distortion of the 
merits of a claim, Iqbal grants a judge free rein to write his “racial 
common sense” 178 into law. 
B. Ziglar v. Abbasi 
In a subsequent case, Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Kennedy again erected 
procedural roadblocks to relief for immigrants detained in the aftermath 
 
667483587/trump-is-reshaping-the-judiciary-a-breakdown-by-race-gender-and-
qualification (showing similar figures for Trump appointees, including those not yet 
confirmed). Justices Alito and Sotomayor have described how their ethnic backgrounds 
inform their judging. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 475 (2006) (“When I get a case about discrimination, I 
have to think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of 
their ethnic background or because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that 
into account.”); Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 
92 (2002) (“I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived 
that life . . . My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate 
them further into areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not know exactly what 
that difference will be in my judging. But I accept there will be some based on my gender 
and my Latina heritage.”). However, only Justice Sotomayor was vilified for her 
comments about a “wise Latina.” See David G. Savage, Sotomayor Backs Off “Wise 
Latina” Remarks, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2009, 12:00 A.M.), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2009/jul/15/nation/na-sotomayor-wise15. 
 176 See Robinson, Unequal, supra note 7, at 197 n.285 (discussing Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007), and Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 374-75 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 177 The Court stated: “We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument 
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 178 See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1822-23 
(2012).  
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of September 11.179 The respondents were detainees who were held in 
the same Brooklyn facility that had held Iqbal and alleged similarly 
harsh conditions, such as physical abuse, excessive strip searches, 
exposure to bright light throughout the day and night, and denial of 
access to basic hygiene.180 The Abbasi respondents alleged that they 
were subjected to these conditions because of their racial and religious 
identities; they asserted violations of equal protection and substantive 
due process under the Fifth Amendment and violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.181 The primary question in the case was whether the lower 
court should have implied a cause of action, following Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,182 in the absence of Congress 
creating a cause of action.  
Despite early cases such as Bivens that generously implied a cause of 
action to vindicate individual rights, Justice Kennedy dismissed this 
practice as belonging to an “ancien regime” and imported a preference 
against implied rights of action from recent statutory cases, such as 
Alexander v. Sandoval.183 Citing Iqbal, Justice Kennedy made clear that 
Bivens remedies are now disfavored and presumptively unavailable.184 
The question of availability, he stated, turns on the extent to which the 
instant claims closely mirror claims in one of the three Supreme Court 
cases where the Court provided a Bivens remedy.185 Justice Kennedy 
then described multiple ways in which a case might differ from these 
precedents and suggested that any such difference precludes an implied 
remedy.186 It is difficult to read this laundry list as anything other than 
a mechanism designed to distinguish prior Bivens cases and deny 
plaintiffs a right of action.187 
 
 179 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865 (2017). 
 180 See id. at 1853-54.  
 181 Id. 
 182 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 183 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001)). 
 184 See id. at 1857 (indicating that Congress “most often” will bear responsibility for 
creating remedies). 
 185 See id. at 1859-60. 
 186 See id. These “meaningful” differences may include “the rank of the officers 
involved; the constitutional right at issue; the statutory or other legal mandate under 
which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into 
the functioning of other branches . . .” and a catch-all — “the presence of potential 
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.” Id.  
 187 Cf. id. at 1865 (holding that even differences that are “perhaps small, at least in 
practical terms” may be “meaningful”).  
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Justice Kennedy applied this test to the Abbasi claims and found they 
were meaningfully different from Bivens precedent. He declared:  
[T]hese claims would call into question the formulation and 
implementation of a general policy. This, in turn, would 
necessarily require inquiry and discovery into the whole course 
of the discussions and deliberations that led to the policies and 
governmental acts being challenged. These consequences 
counsel against allowing a Bivens action against the Executive 
Officials, for the burden and demand of litigation might well 
prevent them — or to be more precise, future officials like them 
— from devoting the time and effort required for the proper 
discharge of their duties.188  
As an additional reason for denying a right of action, Justice Kennedy 
noted that the respondents “challenge as well major elements of the 
Government’s whole response to the September 11 attacks, thus of 
necessity requiring an inquiry into sensitive issues of national 
security. . . . National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress 
and President.”189 Because Bivens and its progeny did not implicate the 
national security context, Justice Kennedy concluded, the Abbasi claims 
were meaningfully different from that precedent.190 Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy found congressional silence since September 11 to be 
“telling.”191 Congress’s failure to provide a remedy, in his view, 
apparently stripped the Court of its role of remedying the violation of 
constitutional rights.192 Although the Court has often cited wartime 
contexts as a special reason for judicial intervention,193 Justice Kennedy 
 
 188 Id. at 1860.  
 189 Id. at 1861.  
 190 See id.  
 191 Id. at 1862. 
 192 But see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605-06 (2015) (“An individual 
can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the 
broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea of the 
Constitution ‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 193 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion by 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy) (“Whatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with 
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1873 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“In wartime as well as peacetime, ‘it is important, in a civilized society, that 
the judicial branch of the Nation’s government stand ready to afford a remedy’ ‘for the 
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regarded them instead as grounds for judicial abdication.194 Trump v. 
Hawaii, discussed below, further extends this posture of deference to a 
policy far removed from the exigent circumstances of September 11 and 
one plainly animated by racist and xenophobic instincts. 
In sum, Justice Kennedy’s opinions in the national security context 
suggest that he regards constitutional liberty as limited for certain 
classes of people, particularly those who are not white, not Christian, 
and/or not born in the United States. This undercurrent of white 
nationalism became explicit in the final opinion that Justice Kennedy 
joined before announcing his retirement. 
III. LGBTQ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONVERGE  
Trump v. Hawaii makes plain Justice Kennedy’s tendency to subjugate 
rights of individuals to claims of executive authority when those 
individuals are people of color and they assert claims that are said to 
implicate national security. Throughout Donald Trump’s campaign and 
well into his presidency, Trump consistently linked Islam with violence 
and hatred of American values and vowed to install a “total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our 
country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”195 Trump’s 
advisor Rudy Giuliani brazenly spoke of Trump asking him to find a 
legal way of effectuating a Muslim ban.196 Yet the majority in Trump v. 
 
most flagrant and patently unjustified,’ unconstitutional ‘abuses of official power.’”) 
(citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 410-
11 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 798 (2008)). Justice Breyer, who also dissented in Iqbal, concluded: “these claims 
are well-pleaded, state violations of clearly established law, and fall within the scope of 
longstanding Bivens law.” Id. at 1873; see also id. at 1878, 1881-82. 
 194 At the end of his opinion, Justice Kennedy lamented: “If the facts alleged in the 
complaint are true, then what happened to respondents in the days following September 
11 was tragic. Nothing in this opinion should be read to condone the treatment to which 
they were subjected. The question before the Court, however, is not whether petitioners’ 
alleged conduct was proper, nor whether it gave decent respect to respondents’ dignity 
and well-being, nor whether it was in keeping with the idea of the rule of law that must 
inspire us even in times of crisis.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869. Yet his professed concern 
with the detainees’ dignity and right to be respected, concepts which are central in his 
sexual orientation opinions, was mere rhetoric in Abbasi. Even a potentially “tragic” 
violation of constitutional rights did not lead Justice Kennedy to permit a judicial 
remedy in the war on terror context.  
 195 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 196 See Rebecca Savransky, Giuliani: Trump Asked Me How to Do a Muslim Ban 
“Legally,” HILL (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:48 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/ 
316726-giuliani-trump-asked-me-how-to-do-a-muslim-ban-legally. 
  
2019] Justice Kennedy’s White Nationalism 1065 
Hawaii — which Justice Kennedy joined — deemed Trump’s 
voluminous remarks “extrinsic statements” that had no bearing on the 
constitutional question since the executive order was facially 
legitimate.197 Relying on Justice Kennedy’s argument in Din, the 
majority opinion declared: “‘[T]he courts will neither look behind that 
exercise of [executive] discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification’ against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. 
citizens.”198 So deferential was the Court that it merely “assume[d]” that 
it had the power to apply the rational basis test, the lowest level of 
constitutional scrutiny. And its application of that test did not 
encompass a search for the actual motive behind the policy, 
notwithstanding a line of cases, including Justice Kennedy’s own Romer 
opinion, that asked the motive question to give some “bite” to the 
analysis.199 The scrutiny that the Court assumed was utterly toothless.  
The Court decided Trump v. Hawaii on the heels of deciding a case 
that involved a clash between claims of religious freedom and LGBTQ 
equality. The Colorado Civil Rights Division brought suit against 
Masterpiece Cakeshop after its owner refused to make a cake for the 
wedding reception of Charlie Craig and David Mullins, a gay male 
couple that planned to marry out of state.200 Jack Phillips, the owner, 
argued that his religious beliefs, his artistic freedom as a baker, and 
Colorado’s failure to recognize same-sex marriage as of 2012, entitled 
him to an exemption from the Colorado antidiscrimination statute.201 
According to an amicus brief filed by the Williams Institute, “after 
[Phillips] rejected the request of Charlie Craig and David Mullins . . . 
Charlie left the bakery shaking, crying, and embarrassed, and feeling 
like a failure before his mother, who witnessed the incident.”202 
 
 197 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418-19; id. at 2421 (“The text says nothing about 
religion.”). The Court regarded the “review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet 
officials and their agencies” as sanitizing any taint stemming from President Trump’s 
anti-Islam statements. Id.  
 198 Id. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).  
 199 See id. at 2420 (“For our purposes today, we assume that we may look behind the 
face of the Proclamation to the extent of applying rational basis review.”); see also Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 450 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1973). 
 200 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Brief of Ilan H. Meyer, PhD, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 
16-111). 
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Colorado courts rejected Phillips’s defenses, and he appealed to the 
Supreme Court.203 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court rhetorically affirmed the 
importance of equality for sexual minorities but ultimately sided with 
the evangelical Christian.204 The baker had discriminated against the 
gay couple and made hateful remarks to another same-sex couple. In 
rejecting a request by a female couple, Phillips asserted that he was “not 
willing to make a cake for a same-sex commitment ceremony, just as he 
would not be willing to make a pedophile cake.”205 Justice Kennedy 
conveniently omitted this fact and somehow regarded the baker as the 
only injured party. Although Justice Kennedy’s earlier sexual 
orientation opinions were bold in calling out animus steeped in 
religious justification,206 his Obergefell opinion smuggled in a validation 
of evangelical perspectives even as it ruled in favor of same-sex 
couples.207 This turnabout set the stage for the evangelical baker in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop to displace the same-sex couple as the real victim. 
The majority concluded that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s 
handling of the dispute “has some elements of a clear and impermissible 
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his 
objection.”208 The majority relied heavily on the following comment 
made by a commissioner:  
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the 
last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to 
 
 203 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111). 
 204 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728-32 (2018). 
 205 Brief for Respondents at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-
111). Comparing an adult couple that desire to make a lifelong romantic commitment 
to child abuse is a play on one of the oldest anti-gay epithets. It serves as a double 
entendre: degrading a consensual, loving relationship by comparing it to the 
victimization of children, and reiterating the baseless stereotype that gays are prone to 
molest children. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, 
Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257 (2009); cf. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s decision to overturn Bowers v. Hardwick opened the door to legalized 
bestiality). 
 206 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 207 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct., 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Many who deem same-
sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious 
or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”); see 
also id. at 2594; Robinson & Frost, Playing It Safe, supra note 64, at 1588-89. 
 208 Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1729.  
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justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether 
it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be — I 
mean, we — we can list hundreds of situations where freedom 
of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it 
is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can 
use to — to use their religion to hurt others.209  
Justice Kennedy regarded this statement as inflammatory: 
To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces 
of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at 
least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also 
by characterizing it as merely rhetorical — something 
insubstantial and even insincere. The commissioner even went 
so far as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held 
religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This 
sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the 
solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of 
Colorado’s antidiscrimination law — a law that protects against 
discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual 
orientation.210  
In short, Justice Kennedy treated the commission as if its zeal for 
protecting LGBTQ rights blinded it to its bias toward religion and 
caused it to violate the foundational rule of religious neutrality. He also 
emphasized that none of the judges who heard the appeal from the 
Commission’s decision disavowed these remarks.211 
Justice Kennedy’s reading of this statement as “clear” evidence of anti-
religious bias212 not only appears overly rooted in his personal intuition, 
making it reminiscent of his Iqbal and Romer opinions, but it also 
ignores well-established facts.213 The commissioner did not actually call 
Christianity “despicable”; rather, she argued that it was despicable to 
use religion to justify discrimination against marginalized groups, 
whether gays and lesbians, enslaved people, or Jewish people.214 This 
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statement need not be read as anti-religion or anti-Christianity. Indeed, 
many Christian scholars and theologians have decried how other 
Christians have used religion to justify oppression — whether racial, 
gender, or other — that is inconsistent with their view of their own 
faith.215 From this Christian perspective, the offense arises from other 
believers turning what they regard as sacred, precious, and inclusive 
into a weapon of oppression and exclusion. Moreover, the Court’s own 
precedents document people who identify as Christian invoking 
religion to justify what is now widely understood as discrimination, 
such as a restaurant refusing to serve black people or a university 
forbidding white people from dating people of color.216 Thus, it should 
be unexceptional for one to recognize the historical fact that many 
people (sincerely or not) have relied on Christianity and other religions 
to oppress marginalized groups. And yes, this history extends to 
religious justifications for the Holocaust and slavery.  
While Justice Kennedy in Masterpiece Cakeshop latched onto stray 
“biased” remarks, raising them at oral argument and eventually making 
them the fulcrum of his opinion, he was at best apathetic about 
President Trump’s pervasive Islamophobic invective. In Trump v. 
Hawaii, Justice Kennedy wrote a brief concurrence stating that just 
because the Constitution allows a person to make biased remarks does 
not mean that he or she should do so.217 Clearly, Justice Kennedy had 
President Trump’s comments in mind, yet in phrasing his concern in 
hypothetical, gender-inclusive terms, he declined to name or confront 
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Trump.218 Hence, his timid approach did exactly what Justice Kennedy 
faulted the Colorado courts for doing in Masterpiece Cakeshop — 
refusing to disavow biased remarks.219  
Further, Justice Kennedy’s handling of these two cases betrayed his 
avowed commitment to neutrality toward religion.220 In Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, he adopted a controversial view of Christianity in claiming 
that the commissioner’s statement was offensive. He offered no citations 
in support of his claim, and seemingly rested on his own perspective as 
a Christian.221 At the same time, he treated far more harmful language 
targeting Islam as beside the point.222 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s concern 
with religious neutrality appeared disproportionately fixated on the 
interests of white, heterosexual, evangelical Christians, as opposed to 
those of all religious people. This bias perpetuated a hierarchy in which 
people who identify with Christianity enjoy greater judicial protection 
than those who practice a minority religion. 
Justice Kennedy’s decision to join the Trump v. Hawaii majority 
opinion is puzzling not just because of its jarring contradiction of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “neutrality” command, but also because it 
gratuitously struck a blow to Romer, one of his most important 
precedents. In Romer and later Windsor, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
the relevant laws were motivated by “animus” or a “bare desire to harm” 
sexual minorities,223 yet he made little effort to define that central 
concept. As I have observed elsewhere, “animus” in these opinions is 
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amenable to a “thin” or “thick” reading.224 Because the opinions do not 
hold together as iterations of the traditional rational basis test, one can 
read them as tacitly adopting a more powerful or “thick” construction 
of equality that bans not only laws based on “hate” (the thin reading) 
but also those that were motivated by anti-gay stereotyping and implicit 
bias. For example, I show that Windsor cannot persuasively be boiled 
down to a conclusion that governmental refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriage arises only from a “bare desire to harm” same-sex couples (the 
thin version). Hostility was certainly in the mix,225 but many politicians 
who opposed same-sex marriage as recently as 2012 were liberals who 
also supported other legal rights for LGBTQ people, such as protection 
from employment discrimination, and were concerned about issues 
such as preserving traditional gender roles.226 Because the Kennedy-era 
Court never formally recognized LGBTQ people as a “suspect class” 
entitled to invoke heightened scrutiny, the question of the robustness 
of Romer and Windsor and their progeny will likely determine the 
trajectory of LGBTQ rights. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Trump v. Hawaii harmed 
LGBTQ rights by diminishing Romer, reading it as a thin and marginal 
case that offers protection only insofar as laws can be traced solely to 
blatant animus.227 This reading is in tension with Romer itself, in which 
Colorado plausibly argued that it was concerned with conserving 
resources and protecting the associational freedoms of religious 
people.228 It is true that Justice Kennedy brushed aside these 
rationales,229 but he provided no reasoning to explain why they could 
not have formed at least part of the state’s justification. Nor did he offer 
any methodology (such as examining ballot materials to see if they 
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relied on homophobic arguments) to guide future courts in deciding 
when a law is really based on hatred.230 
Of all the possible readings of Romer, Chief Justice Roberts selected a 
malnourished version in order to deem Romer inapposite because, at 
worst, the travel ban was motivated by animus and national security.231 
Remarkably, Justice Kennedy signed onto this minimalist reading of 
Romer and rejected the principal dissent’s more capacious construction 
of Romer.232 Just hours before announcing his retirement, Justice 
Kennedy threw precedent central to his legacy into grave doubt and set 
back LGBTQ rights. When faced with a choice between legitimizing a 
ban on immigrants and bolstering the rights of sexual minorities (who 
were sure to face an assault as soon as he retired), Justice Kennedy opted 
to end his career by writing white nationalism into law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has sought to complicate the tendency of many scholars 
and activists to view cases like Romer and Obergefell solely through the 
“single axis” of gay and lesbian rights. By using doctrinal 
intersectionality to connect domestic disputes with international ones 
and sexuality cases with immigration and national security decisions, 
we can begin to see Justice Kennedy’s hierarchical value system, which 
reflects white nationalism. From this vantage point, white Christian 
citizens sit atop a legal and social caste system, respectable gays and 
lesbians who marry reside a rung below, and racial and religious 
minorities, especially those who are non-citizens, are trapped at the 
bottom.233 The empathy and dignity that guided Justice Kennedy’s 
pathbreaking sexual orientation decisions failed to trickle down to 
reach the minorities in the immigration and national security cases. 
Moreover, this caste system ultimately turned on gays and lesbians 
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when their rights were seen as a threat to those of a white evangelical 
heterosexual man.  
Ultimately all of these cases may pale in comparison to the harm that 
Justice Kennedy inflicted on LGBTQ people and other marginalized 
groups by coordinating with President Trump to ensure that Trump 
could replace Justice Kennedy with a more conservative Justice.234 By 
most accounts, Justice Brett Kavanaugh is more conservative than 
Justice Kennedy and poses a risk to the rights of women, people of color, 
and LGBTQ people.235 Only time will tell.236 This exploration offers a 
cautionary tale for the LGBTQ rights movement, which should now 
understand that the security of LGBTQ rights is interconnected with 
that of other marginalized populations. Hopefully, the movement can 
evolve into a truly intersectional and inclusive formation that affirms 
the humanity of all. Further, this Essay pushes scholars of constitutional 
law to test claims by Justice Kennedy and other Justices that they adhere 
to neutral rules by inspecting the connections between and among 
cases. 
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